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The Analysis of Zheng-Seberry ShemeDavid Soldera and Jennifer SeberryCentre for Computer Seurity ResearhUniversity of Wollongong, NSW 2522, AustraliaE-mail: jennieuow.edu.auChengxin QuShool of Mathematial and Computer SieneUniversity of New England, Armidale, NWS 2531, AustraliaE-mail: xquturing.une.edu.auAbstratThe Zheng-Seberry (ZS) enryption sheme was published in 1993and was one of the rst pratial shemes that was onsidered seureagainst a hosen iphertext adversary. This paper shows some prob-lems that the semanti seurity of the one-way hash variant of the ZSsheme is inseure on some speial irumstanes. Attempts to modifythe ZS sheme resulted on an El-Gamal variant that is provably seurein the random orale model.1 IntrodutionIn 1993 Zheng-Seberry [9℄ presented a paper introduing three new publi-key enryption shemes that were eÆient and onsidered seure againsta hosen iphertext adversary, under some assumptions. Sine then muhprogress has made in the area of provable seurity for publi-key ryptosys-tems, from those that use the Random Orale (RO) model [2℄ to the shemeby Cramer-Shoup (CS) [4℄ that is provably seure using standard publi keyryptography assumptions.Using the RO model or standard assumptions represent opposite endsof the provable seurity spetrum. The RO model yields extremely eÆientshemes yet pratial implementations using hash funtions fall short ofatual RO's. Using standard assumptions gives us tremendous ondenein seurity yet shemes are still too ineÆient for the majority of pratialimplementations. 1
The hardness of the DiÆe-Hellman deision problem is essentially equiv-alent to the semanti seurity of basi El-Gamal enryption sheme [5℄. Thebasi El-Gamal sheme is ompletely inseure against adaptive hosen i-phertext attak. This new Seure El-Gamal sheme was born out of theOWH variant of the original ZS sheme, sine as shall be seen in setion 2.2it is inseure against a hosen iphertext adversary (CCA). Seuring the ZSsheme meant providing a proof for seurity and the best proof (in that itrequires the least assumptions) was that by Cramer-Shoup. Unfortunatelythe CS proof annot easily be used to prove the seurity of Seure El-gamal.So setion 3 presents the new Seure El-Gamal sheme, and a proof of se-urity whih borrows many parts of the CS proof. Unfortunately, the proofstill needs to rely on the random orale model, but enouragingly, it onlyrelies on it in a minimal way.It has beome standard pratie that the level of seurity required for apubli-key ryptosystem is indistinguishability of enryptions, IND, (equiv-alently semanti seurity or non-malleability) against an adaptive hoseniphertext adversary (CCA2), for formal denitions see [1℄. The basi ideabehind an IND-CCA2 adversary is that they are given aess to an enryp-tion and deryption orale, they then hoose two messages, one of whihgets enrypted (they do not know whih). They are then presented withthe iphertext of the enrypted message and asked to determine whih ofthe two messages was enrypted. They must sueed with probability non-negligibly better than 0.5. The only restrition is the adversary may notquery the deryption orale with the hallenge iphertext.2 Original ZSThe ZS paper presented three variants of an El-Gamal like ryptosystem.The three variants were desribed as `immunising' the ryptosystem againsta CCA2 adversary. The variants inorporated a one-way hash funtion(OWH), a universal hash funtion and a digital signature.2.1 ZS-OWHThe ZS-OWH variant is presented below.
2
ZS-OWHPreliminaries:Consider message of length n, a one-way hash funtion Hwith output length k0 and a PRNG G with output length n+ k0.Operations are modulo p and there is a generator g.Key Generation:Private key is xR 2 GF (p) and publi key is yR = gxR mod p.Enryption;1; x 2R [1; p  1℄ 2; z = G(yxR)[1K (n+k0)℄3; t = H(m)4; 1 = gx 5; 2 = z  (mjjt)Ciphertext is (1; 2)Deryption:1; z0 = G(xR1 )[1K (n+k0)℄ 2; w = z0  23; m = w[1:::n℄ 4; t0 = w[(n+1)K(n+k0)℄If H(m) = t0, then output m else output ;.The seurity of ZS-OWH depends on the hardness of DiÆe-Hellman oneway problem.2.2 Breaking ZS-OWH in IND-CCA2 Sense\Due to the involvement of t = H(m), the reation of theiphertext is apparently impossible without the knowledge of xand m. : : :. This motivates us to introdue a notion alledsole  samplable spae." ([9℄, pg. 721)If the authors had to pik an assumption in the ZS paper that ultimatelyturned out to be inorret, the above assumption would be an appropriatehoie. As it turns out an adversary an reate a new iphertext from anexisting iphertext, if the message in the existing iphertext is known.To see how this is ahieved onsider the last part of the iphertext,2 = z  (mjjt) = z  (mjjH(m));whih just depends on the message. So if the message is known, this partof the iphertext an be rereated. If the adversary wishes to replae themessage m with another message m0, this an be ahieved via:02 = 2  (mjjH(m))  (m0jjH(m0))3
= z  (mjjH(m)) (mjjH(m))  (m0jjH(m0))= z  [(mjjH(m))  (mjjH(m))℄  (m0jjH(m0))= z  (m0jjH(m0));in whih [(mjjH(m))  (mjjH(m))℄ = 0 due to Boolean addition.The new iphertext is (1; 02) and the adversary is suessful in manip-ulating the ryptosystem.This attak an be used by a CCA2 adversary to defeat IND and theadversary sueeds 100% of the time. In this situation the adversary does notknow whih of two messages, m0 or m1, has been enrypted, but they knowone of them has been. Let the enrypted message be mb where b 2 [0; 1℄.The adversary uses the above attak by setting m = m0 and m0 = m1 andreates a new ryptogram via:02 = 2  [m0jjH(m0)℄ [m1jjH(m1)℄= z  [mbjjH(mb)℄ [m0jjH(m0)℄ [m1jjH(m1)℄= z  [m:bjjH(m:b)℄Hene the adversary reates a new iphertext (1; 02), whih is a valid i-phertext for the message that was not enrypted in the hallenge iphertext.Sine the adversary is a CCA2 adversary, and the new iphertext is not thehallenge iphertext, they may query the deryption orale with it. The de-ryption orale will dutifully return the message that was not enrypted, mb,and the adversary makes their hoie for b as orresponding to the messagenot returned by the deryption orale.The ZS-OWH sheme is largely of theoretial value to the ryptographiommunity, so while breaking the sheme does not have many pratialimpliations, it is still of theoretial use. This break highlights the impor-tane of adding random information to the hek on the message, as shallbe shown. Also, as reently as EUROCRYPT 2000, a paper [6℄ made refer-ene to the ZS paper with the impliation being it was seure, under someassumptions. So this attak means ZS-OWH now needs to be added to thelist of shemes that were onsidered seure but turned out to be inseure.This attak on ZS-OWH is a very trivial one and as ould be expeteda trivial hange to the sheme thwarts this attak. By simply reating anew variable r = yxR and hanging t = H(mjjr), then the attak no longerworks. The hange inorporates some randomness into the hash alulationand thus defeats the above attak as the adversary an no longer reate theonatenation of message and hash beause the adversary does not know the4
random information. This hange defeats the above attak, but of oursedoes not prove the seurity of the sheme.This hange was borrowed from an authentiated-enryption version ofZS-OWH by Zheng [8℄, however Zheng stresses that the hanges made areonly needed for the new sheme proposed and that the original sheme isseure.3 Seure El-GamalThe attak and the repair of the original ZS-OWH leaves a rather largequestion mark over its seurity. Seuring the original ZS-OWH sheme ledto a new El-Gamal variant. Great eorts were made to prove the seurityof this new variant using the CS proof and thus derive a sheme that wasseure under some reasonable assumptions, but without using the RO model.Unfortunately, this goal was not realised, but enouragingly the proof doesnot heavily rely on the RO model.Seure El-GamalPreliminaries:Consider messages of length n  k0, a random orale H with outputlength k0. Operations are modulo p where p = 2q + 1 (q is a prime)and a generator g of order q.Key Generation:Private key is xR 2 GF (p) and publi key is yR = gxR mod p.Enryption: Enrypt message m as follows;1; x 2R [1; p  1℄ 2; r = yxR3; t = H(mjjr)4; 1 = gx 5; 3 = r  (mjjt)2Ciphertext is (1; 3).Deryption:1; r0 = xR12; w = q 3r0 (hoose square root that yields the orret hash)3; m = w[1(n k0)℄ 4; t0 = w[(n k0+1)Kn℄If H(mjjr0) = t0, then output m, else output ;.The dierenes between this and the original El-Gamal sheme is theaddition of the hash appended to the message, and the squaring of themessage and hash to onvert them into a quadrati residue (this makes itan element of the quadrati residues of GF (p), the group of order q). Note5
that in step 2 of the deryption, if neither square root yields a orret hashthen the output is ;.The proof relies on the diÆulty of the Deision DiÆe-Hellman Problem(DDHP), the denition of whih, from Cramer-Shoup, is given below.Denition 1 - ([4℄, pg. 16) Let G be a group of large prime order q. Con-sider the following two distributions:{ the distribution R of random quadruples (g1; g2; u1; u2) 2 G4;{ the distribution D of quadruples (g1; g2; u1; u2) 2 G4, where g1; g2 arerandom, and u1 = gr1 and u2 = gr2 for random r 2 Zq.An algorithm that solves the DDHP is a statistial test that an ee-tively distinguish between these two distributions. For a given quadrupleoming from one of the two distributions, it should output 0 or 1 and thereshould be a non-negligible dierene between the probability that it outputs1 given an input from R and the probability that it outputs 1 given an in-put from D. The deision DiÆe-Hellman problem is hard if there is no suhpolynomial-time statistis test.The onstrution of the proof is as follows. It is assumed an adversarythat an break the ryptosystem in the IND-CCA2 sense exists, and thenit is shown how this adversary an unwittingly be used to help solve whatis onsidered a omputationally unfeasible problem, in this ase the DDHP.The onstrution of the proof an be seen in Figure 1.The input to the proof are quadruples oming from either D or R (butnot both). These go to a onstruted simulator, whih is responsible for,the reation of keys, simulation of an enryption orale and simulation ofa deryption orale. The IND-CCA2 adversary reeives all its information,inluding orale queries, from the simulator.The proof runs as follows. A quadruple is input. The simulator reatesa valid seret key (one only) and the publi key, whih is passed to theIND-CCA2 adversary. The adversary runs its rst stage A1 and produestwo messages m0 and m1. Then it passes the two messages to the simulatedenryption orale. The simulated enryption orale hooses a random bit b 2[0; 1℄, enrypts mb and passes the hallenge iphertext bak to the adversary.The adversary annot see the simulator's hoie for b.The adversary then runs its seond stage, A2, on the hallenge iphertextand outputs its guess, b0, for the random bit. Both the simulator and theadversary pass b and b0 respetively to a distinguisher that outputs 1 if b = b0otherwise 0. 6
Consider the ase when the input omes from R, the simulator is unableto reate a valid iphertext (as the relation that quadruples from D have, arenot present in quadruples from R). This fat will be ruial in showing theadversary annot sueed in guessing b with any advantage. Alternatively,when the input omes from D, then the simulator reates a perfetly validiphertext and the adversary an guess the bit b with an advantage.Input from D or R?SimulatorKey GenerationSet up keys ? m0; m1-mbSimulation ofEnryption Orale  -Simulation ofDeryption Orale
IND-CCA2adversary that anbreak theryptosystem
-b  b'Distinguisher?0 or 1Figure-1: Graphial representation for the onstrutionof the Seure El-Gamal proof.Hene by observing the distribution of 0's and 1's that are output bythe distinguisher, it an be determined whih distribution the quadruplesare oming from. If the quadruples are oming from R then 1's will ourwith probability 0.5 and 0's with probability 0.5. The adversary will only beorret half the time, as it has no advantage. If the quadruples ome fromD then the adversary has an advantage and 1's will our with probability0:5 + " (where " is the adversary's non-negligible advantage) and 0's with7
probability 0:5   ".Hene, by observation of the output distribution, one has a statistialtest for the DDHP.The onstrution of the proof is relatively simple, however there areseveral properties that must hold for the proof to be valid. The simulator must reate a valid iphertext if the quadruple omesfrom D and an invalid iphertext if the quadruple omes from R. When the quadruple omes from D the joint distribution of the adver-sary's view and the random bit bmust be statistially indistinguishablefrom that in an atual attak. When the quadruple omes from R the distribution of the random bitb must be (essentially) independent from the adversary's view.Theorem 1 Seure El-Gamal is seure against adaptive hosen iphertextattak in the Random Orale model assuming that the DiÆe-Hellman dei-sion problem is hard in the group GF (p).The proof of seurity is for a sheme that is slight variant of the El-Gamalsheme desribed above, but the two shemes are interhangeable. Thesheme used in the proof has an extra part to the iphertext, 2. A iphertextfrom the El-Gamal sheme (above) an be transformed into one for thissheme (in the proof) by (1; 3) ! (1; 2; 3  2). The transformationbak is obvious.First the simulator is desribed. On input the quadruple (g1; g2; 1; 2)the simulator generates a random private key xR 2R GF (p) and outputs thepubli key as yR = gxR .The simulator simulates the enryption orale as follows. On input twomessages m0 and m1 it selets a random bit b 2 [0; 1℄ and omputes:r = xR13 = (r  2) (mbjjH(mbjjr))2The simulated enryption orale outputs (1; 2; 3), where 1 and 2 omefrom the input quadruple to the simulator.The simulator simulates the deryption orale as follows. On input(1; 2; 3) it omputes:r = xR1w = q 3(r2) (hoose the square root that yields the orret hash)m = w[1(n k0)℄ 8
If the simulated deryption orale outputs m, else it outputs ;.The aim now is to show that when the input omes from D the simulatorsimulates the enryption and deryption orales perfetly (probabilistially)and the advantage of the adversary is apparent at the distinguisher. Al-ternatively, if the input omes from R then the output of the simulatedenryption orale will not be a valid iphertext in the sense that .It is also important to note that sine the DDHP is hard for the adversarythey annot even nd out any partial information about the seret key thatould be used to determine b.The theorem follows from the following two lemmas.Lemma 1 - When the simulator's input omes from D, the joint distribu-tion of the adversary's view and the hidden bit b is statistially indistinguish-able from that in the atual attak.In this ase it is lear the output of the simulated enryption orale hasthe right form as xR1 2 = (gx1 )xRgx2 = (gxR1 )xgx2 = yxRgx2whih is equivalent to the output of the atual enryption orale. Similarly,the simulated deryption orale will aept all valid iphertexts.It remains to be shown that all invalid iphertexts are rejeted with over-whelming probability. If an invalid iphertext (in the sense that logg1 1 6=logg2 2) is presented as a query to the deryption orale it will be rejetedas the resulting r will not be orret for reovering m from 3. More impor-tantly the invalid iphertext will not pass the hek involving the randomorale (H). By using a random orale it is ensured that the hash is om-pletely non-malleable and no partial information is leaked.Lemma 2 - When the simulator's input omes from R, the distribution ofthe hidden bit is (essentially) independent from the adversary's view.First it will be shown that no partial information about b is leaked fromjust the hallenge iphertext, this essentially is showing IND-CPA seurity.Then it will be shown that there is only a negligible hane that the simu-lated deryption orale gives the adversary any information about b. Sinean IND-CCA2 adversary that annot gain any information from a deryp-tion orale is equivalent to an IND-CPA adversary, the lemma is proven.It has been shown that assuming DDHP the El-Gamal ryptosystem isseure in the sense of IND-CPA [3, 7℄. To show the IND-CPA seurity of this9
sheme it will be shown how to onvert an El-Gamal hallenge iphertextinto one for this sheme. First a seond generator needs to be reated,if p is of the form p = 2q + 1, then there are q   1 generators. Hene byonsidering powers of g1 a seond generator of the form g2 = gw1 an be foundin polynomial time, with w known. So gx2 an be alulated as (gx1 )w. So anEl-Gamal hallenge iphertext an be transformed into a Seure El-Gamalhallenge iphertext as(gx1 ; yxR mb)! (gx1 ; gx2 ; (yxRgx2 )mb):It should be noted that the message is a dierent size to a message in anatual Seure El-Gamal hallenge iphertext. However this is not an issue, ifp is an n bit prime, and the hash funtion outputs 128 bits, then the hanesthat two messages hosen at random do not dier in the rst n  128 bits isn2 128, whih is negligible for suitable large n. The absene of the appendedhash is irrelevant sine the use of a random orale ensures no informationabout m is leaked to an IND-CPA adversary. Also, without aess to aderyption orale there is no need for a orret hash value to be present inthe iphertext.The simulated deryption orale still needs to rejet all invalid ipher-texts, otherwise relevant information will be leaked. A valid iphertext is(1; 2; 3), an invalid one is (01; 02; 03). There are two ases to onsider.1) (3) = (03). If this happens with non-negligible probability then therandom orale must not be one way sine 01 and 02 will reate a dif-ferent r (as they are dierent from 1 and 2) and this will ausederyption to a dierent message and hash. If the hash hek passes,then the hash has been reated without knowledge of the message.2) (1; 2) = (01; 02). With 3 6= 03, then the adversary has to replaethe message and hash in 3 to reate 03. They an't just replae themessage as if the hash hek passes then a ollision has been found.They an't replae the hash, or the message and hash, as withoutomplete knowledge of r the orret hash annot be alulated, and ifit ould then a ollision ould be found.Using a random orale means that one-wayness and ollision-freenessannot be defeated, in fat no partial information is leaked about the pre-image of the hash. Thus, the simulated deryption orale will rejet allinvalid iphertexts, exept with negligible probability.Hene if the DDHP is a omputationally unfeasible problem then anIND-CCA2 attaker for Seure El-Gamal annot exist.10
4 ConlusionThis paper has shown that the one-way hash variant of the sheme by Zheng-Seberry [9℄ is inseure in the sense of IND against a hosen iphertext ad-versary.A new sheme was reated, 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